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Figurative language and our perceptuo-motor experiences frequently associate social sta-
tus with physical space. In three experiments we examine the source and extent of these
associations by testing whether people implicitly associate abstract social status indicators
with concrete representations of spatial topography (level versus mountainous land) and
relatively abstract representations of cardinal direction (south and north). Experiment 1
demonstrates speeded performance during an implicit association test (Greenwald et al.,
1998)when average social status is pairedwith level topography and high statuswithmoun-
tainous topography. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate a similar effect but with relatively
abstract representations of cardinal direction (south and north), with speeded performance
when average and powerful social status are paired with south and north coordinate space,
respectively. Abstract concepts of social status are perceived and understood in an inher-
ently spatial world, resulting in powerful associations between abstract social concepts and
concrete and abstract notions of physical axes.These associations may prove inﬂuential in
guiding daily judgments and actions.
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INTRODUCTION
For millennia, cultures have manipulated space at both small and
large scales, from footwear to city planning, to convey social sta-
tus (Hodder, 1987; Bourdieu, 1989; Margolies, 2003). The ancient
Maya associated power and wealth with higher elevations and
the north, and arranged their cities accordingly, placing leaders
and elite atop hills, and to the north within civic centers (Ash-
more, 1991; Robin, 2001). Today, the link between social status
and the vertical dimension is deeply ingrained in our thought
and environment, demonstrated by linguistic references to social
hierarchies, with high status individuals acting as overseers, or
metaphorically climbing the corporate ladder. Further evidence
from the built environment reinforces this link through the ele-
vated placement of high status real estate (e.g., CEO’s ofﬁces) and
prominent buildings (e.g., the U.S. Capitol on Capitol Hill). Our
surrounding environment often functions as a non-linguistic sym-
bol of abstract concepts like social status, and it is directly tied
to perceptual and modality-speciﬁc experiences. Together ﬁgura-
tive language, the built environment, and our perceptuo-motor
experiences inﬂuence our mental representations by both explic-
itly and implicitly associating spatial information with intangible
concepts. Consequently, abstract ideas such as social status may
acquire spatial characteristics, and social information may be inte-
grated into our conceptualization of space. As a result, the integra-
tion of spatial and social knowledge may bi-directionally inﬂuence
real-world perception and decision making. The present three
experiments extend recent research by examining the extent to
which we associate social status with both concrete and abstracted
representations of space.
Many abstract concepts can be understood through metaphor-
ical connections to more experienced-based domains (e.g., Gibbs,
1994; Boroditsky and Prinz, 2008). In other words, our percep-
tual, sensory, and interoceptive experiences with the world can be
used to structure our conceptualization of abstract concepts, and
moreover, these perceptuo-motoric representations may even be
necessary elements underlying conceptual understanding (Barsa-
lou, 1999). According to theories of embodied cognition, thought
is inherently bound to sensation and perception (e.g., Niedenthal
et al., 2005), such that understanding both concrete and abstract
concepts would require simulation of modality-speciﬁc actions
or neurocognitive states (e.g., affect; Willems and Casasanto,
2011). Grounding abstract words and concepts in more concrete
domains, such as space, allows us to transfer knowledge from our
body–world (and brain–body) experiences to better understand
otherwise intangible concepts. For instance, people use spatial
representations when thinking about time, to the extent that an
individual’s perception of time is dependent upon their unique
experiences with space (e.g., Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Borodit-
sky and Ramscar, 2002). Further, abstract notions of positive
versus negative affective valence are linked with both the hori-
zontal (Casasanto and Chrysikou, 2011) and vertical (Meier and
Robinson, 2004) spatial axes. More speciﬁcally, Casasanto’s body-
speciﬁcity hypothesis suggests that our bodily interactions with the
environment give rise to mental metaphors grounding abstract
concepts in a spatial dimension, such that unique experiences
with the world (e.g., right versus left handedness) inﬂuence, at
the very least, the origin of some abstract concepts (Casasanto,
2009).
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Similarly, abstract indicators of social status such as power,
wealth, inﬂuence, or intellect are often associated with the ver-
tical dimension through the use of metaphor in both linguistic
(Boroditsky, 2000) and non-linguistic (Casasanto and Boroditsky,
2008) contexts, indicating that people may also structure their
conceptualization of social status using their perceptuo-motor
experiences with physical space. The idea that social status is con-
ceptualized in the vertical spatial dimension is not new (e.g.,Piaget,
1927/1969; Tversky et al., 1991). To date, dozens of experiments
across a wide range of disciplines, from psychology to anthropol-
ogy and archeology, have found relationships between the vertical
spatial position“up”and power (e.g., Epperson, 2000; Robin, 2001;
Schubert, 2005; Isbell and Silverman, 2006; Meier et al., 2007), and
others have demonstrated that people mentally simulate upward
motoric movement when thinking about wealth (Casasanto and
Lozano,2006).Notably, conceptualizing social status by grounding
it in the sensory and motoric modalities may result in unfounded
associations between “up” and power, indirectly inﬂuencing our
judgments and decisions regarding other individuals. For exam-
ple, meta-analyses have identiﬁed positive correlations between
height and salary (1′′ of height was worth an extra $789/year in
salary; Judge and Cable, 2004), and individuals are more likely
to hold a position of power if they are taller (Giessner and Schu-
bert, 2007), suggesting that underlying associations between social
status and vertical spacemay result inmisperceptions of taller indi-
viduals as more powerful or inﬂuential, and consequently guide
promotion decisions. Similarly, Carney et al. (2005) found that
powerful individuals are perceived as having more erect posture,
and other evidence suggests that executives can acquire status (and
increase their own testosterone levels) by standing taller and tak-
ing upmore space (Tiedens and Fragale, 2003). Together, this work
demonstrates anunderlying associationbetweenvertical space and
social status that can bias perception and decision making.
Whereas much of the foregoing research may prima facie sup-
port an embodied representationof social status andother abstract
concepts, evidence for a fully embodied account of abstract repre-
sentation remains sparse and equivocal (e.g., Kranjec and Chatter-
jee, 2010; Dove, 2011; Pecher and Boot, 2011). Likewise, without
directly testing for overlapping neural substrates responsible for
concrete and abstract thought, and without demonstrating that
brain regions tied to action simulation are required for com-
prehension, much of the extant literature does not necessarily
provide unequivocal evidence for embodiment (e.g., Willems and
Casasanto, 2011), and the results could instead be explained by
a number of theories, including conceptual metaphor theory
(e.g., Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), linguistic and situated simu-
lation theory (LASS; Barsalou et al., 2008), the grounding by
interaction framework (Mahon and Caramazza, 2008), and sym-
bol interdependency theory (Louwerse and Connell, 2011). For
instance, people might simulate modality-speciﬁc actions in the
upward direction when they think about power, but the spatio-
motor simulation might be epiphenomenal and unnecessary
for comprehension. Instead, the concept of “power” could acti-
vate a semantic network of related, shallow linguistic concepts
(e.g., power> king>mighty> high), triggering activation of the
amodal concept “up,” and only afterward simulation of an action.
Some propose that abstract thought is partially represented in
linguistic terms and partially in perceptuo-motoric systems, and
while sensory simulation might not be necessary for comprehen-
sion, it may enrich conceptualization of abstract concepts (e.g.,
Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; Dove, 2009; for a review see Pecher
et al., 2011). Regardless of the exact nature of abstract represen-
tations, a large body of data suggests that social status is thought
about in spatial terms, likely resulting from experiences in a spa-
tial world, thereby grounding an abstract concept in a relatively
concrete domain.
The present experiments extend the current literature by inves-
tigating implicit associations between social status and real-world
spatial concepts.Whereas previous research has identiﬁed the rela-
tionship between the vertical spatial position“up”and power (e.g.,
Schubert, 2005;Meier et al., 2007),we examine the extent to which
this social–spatial association may apply to larger-scale concepts
of vertical space encountered in the environment. Not only might
we perceive taller individuals as more powerful, but we might also
associate power with higher elevations (e.g., top ﬂoors of build-
ings or mountains), or even with more abstract representations
of “up” (e.g., north). Recent evidence for a north-is-up heuristic
(Brunyé et al., 2010) demonstrates physically unfounded associ-
ations between north and mountainous topography, and south
and level topography. These associations are thought to be medi-
ated by a vertically oriented conceptualization of mountains/level
terrain and the north/south canonical axes. While people might
not explicitly associate power with mountains or north (and most
likely do not have amodality-speciﬁc experience associating power
with mountains/north), if each of these different concepts shares
an association with a more general spatial concept (e.g., “up”),
then this general association might transitively link social status,
topography, and cardinal direction. Such a link may occur either
through second-order amodal semantic connections or simulation
of modal-speciﬁc experiences shared between domains. If we do
in fact transitively associate individuals’ social status with concrete
spatial features like topography and more abstract spatial features
like cardinal directions, these associations could have pervasive
inﬂuences on the way we perceive both individuals and space.
Testing this possibility, three experiments investigated the
extent to which people automatically associate levels of social sta-
tus (powerful versus average individuals) with different exemplars
of vertical space, represented by spatial topography (Experiment 1)
or cardinal direction (Experiments 2/3). To evaluate the strength
of these associations, we adapted the implicit association test (IAT;
Greenwald et al., 1998), a research tool that has traditionally been
used to examine implicit associations in social and personality
psychology. For example, the racial IAT evaluates the extent to
which individuals automatically associate racial categories (i.e.,
black/white) with valence (i.e., good/bad). For the present exper-
iments, we asked whether the categorization of average versus
powerful individualswith topography (mountainous/level terrain;
Experiment 1) or cardinal direction (north/south; Experiments
2/3) would reveal implicit associations between social status and
different representations of vertical space. If the conceptualiza-
tion of social status in the spatial domain extends beyond just
vertical spatial positions (e.g., location on a computer moni-
tor, vertical gestures) to larger-scale concrete (e.g., topography)
and abstracted (e.g., cardinal directions) representations of space,
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then the categorization of average versus powerful people should
be facilitated when paired with a representation of level ter-
rain/south and mountains/north, respectively. Faster pairings of
average and level/south, and powerful and mountains/north (rela-
tive to the opposite pairings) would indicate an implicit and auto-
matic association between hierarchical social status and real-world
representations of vertical space.
EXPERIMENT 1
For our ﬁrst experiment, we adapted the IAT to evaluate the
implicit association between social status target categories (pow-
erful/average individuals) and topographical attributes (moun-
tainous/level terrain). If participants automatically conceptualize
social status in the vertical dimension, and if this transitively links
social status to other concepts associated with vertical space (e.g.,
topography), we could expect that they will be faster to categorize
powerful individuals with mountains, which represent higher ele-
vation, and average individuals with level terrain relative to when
they categorize powerful individuals with level terrain and average
individuals with mountains.
METHOD
Participants and design
Forty consenting undergraduates (age M = 20.5, SD= 1.74; 27
female) participated for monetary compensation ($10). In a
within-participants design, each participant completed both con-
gruent (powerful/mountainous, average/level) and incongruent
(average/mountainous, powerful/level) associations.
Materials
The target social status and topographical attribute categories were
represented with images (see examples in Figure 1). For the target
categories, we developed a total of 16 images (302 × 330 pixels)
depicting powerful and average individuals. To manipulate social
status, we chose eight powerful individuals chosen from Time
magazine’s list of the world’s most inﬂuential people (unfamil-
iar people only; wearing professional business attire), and eight
average individuals from Google™Images (wearing casual attire).
The individuals were equated for perceived age, gender, and skin
tone across the average/powerful categories. Further, in a pilot
experiment (n = 10)we collected ratings of nine traits – attractive-
ness, happiness, likeability, trustworthiness, understanding, intel-
ligence, power, wealth, and inﬂuence – for each of the target image
individuals, using 7-point scales. Ratings conﬁrmed that average
and powerful individuals were equated for attractiveness, hap-
piness, likeability, trustworthiness, and understanding (ps> 0.1),
and powerful individuals were judged as more powerful, wealthy,
and inﬂuential than average individuals (ps< 0.01). Thus, any
effects between average/powerful categories could be attributed
to the greater perceived power, wealth, or inﬂuence of the power-
ful individuals, but are unlikely to be explained by manipulations
of the other traits.
For the 12 attribute images (482× 333 pixels), vertical space
was depicted in 12 photographs, six of which depicted mountains
and six depicted level ground, controlling for perceived climate
(i.e.,within each group of six images, threewere froma cold/snowy
and three from a warm/sunny climate). Luminance was equalized
FIGURE 1 | Example stimuli used in the adapted implicit association
test. First row: Experiment 1 topography stimuli, with examples of
mountainous (left) and level terrain (right). Second row: Experiment 2
cardinal indicator stimuli, with examples of north (left) and south (right)
indication. Third row: Experiment 3 cardinal indicator stimuli, with examples
of north (left) and south (right) indication. Fourth row: Experiments 1, 2, and
3 social status stimuli, with examples of powerful (left) and average (right).
across all target and attribute images. For stimulus presentation
and data collection,we used an iMac with a 24′′ widescreen display
running SuperLab 4.0 (Cedrus, Inc.) software.
Procedure
Each participant completed seven blocks of categorization trials,
in the standard IAT format developed by Greenwald et al. (1998),
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categorizing both congruent and incongruent combinations in
an order counterbalanced across participants. Images appeared
on the screen one at a time, and social status and vertical space
were categorized both separately and then in combination. All
images appeared in both the congruent and incongruent condi-
tions within subjects. Block 1 consisted of an initial target (i.e.,
social status) concept discrimination,duringwhich the participant
practiced categorizing the 16 powerful/average images using desig-
nated left (F) and right (J) keys over the course of 20 trials. For half
of the participants, powerful was assigned to the left key and aver-
age was assigned to the right key; for the remaining participants,
this mapping was reversed. Block 2 involved an initial attribute
(i.e., topography) discrimination, during which the participant
practiced categorizing the 12 mountainous versus level terrain
images, over the course of 20 trials. Attribute categorization was
always assigned to the same keys (mountainous terrain: F, level ter-
rain: J). Block 3 involved 40 practice trials of the initial combined
task, which required categorizing both the target and attribute
images with the initially learned keys, such that half of the par-
ticipants performed the congruent task (powerful/mountainous,
average/level) ﬁrst, and half performed the incongruent task (aver-
age/mountainous, powerful/level) ﬁrst, thus minimizing potential
combination order effects. Block 4was identical to Block 3,butwas
considered an experimental block. During Block 5, participants
completed 20 trials practicing a reversed target concept and key
pairing from that learned in Block 1 (powerful/average images).
Block 6 introduced the reversed combined task, and was identical
to Block 3 except that the powerful/average were now associated
with the opposite keys (F or J), requiring categorization of social
status with different topography. Further, Block 7 was identical to
Block 6, but, like Block 4, was considered an experimental block.
The practice blocks (3 and 6) were designed to provide partici-
pants adequate time to practice the current category–key pairings,
and to minimize effects of learning key combinations during the
subsequent experimental blocks (4 and 8). Written instructions
were provided preceding each of the seven blocks; in general, par-
ticipants were instructed to classify each image as quickly and
accurately as possible, but that it was alright if theymade a fewmis-
takes. Trials were randomized within each block and self-paced.
Accuracy and response time data were automatically collected.
RESULTS
Scoring and analysis
We used an improved scoring algorithm to calculate corrected
response latencies for test blocks, and also provide standardized
IAT D values (Greenwald et al., 2003), both to ensure applicability
to the extant IAT literature. The scoring algorithm removed tri-
als with response latencies above 10,000ms, and participants with
latencies below 300ms (no trials or participants met these crite-
ria)1. Then, mean response latencies were calculated for accurate
trials in the practice (3 and 6) and experimental (4 and 7) blocks.
Response latencies for error trials were replaced with the mean for
that block plus 600ms, and the resulting trial response latencies
1Note that analyses using uncorrected response latencies revealed an identical
pattern of results.
were then averaged across blocks, providing us with a single cor-
rected response latency mean for practice and experimental blocks
for each of our two combined tasks (congruent, incongruent). The
data was further separable as a function of whether the participant
categorized congruent versus incongruent concepts during their
ﬁrst combined blocks.
For each experiment,we provide results from two separate ana-
lytical approaches. First, linear mixed-effects models with random
intercepts for subjects and items were used to analyze corrected
response latencies. Linear mixed-effects models allow us to take
into account both ﬁxed and random effects within the same model
(e.g., Baayen et al., 2008; Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2010). Mod-
els were ﬁt using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2008) for the
statistical program R. Response time outliers (M ± 2.5 SD) were
removed and remaining response times were log10 transformed to
correct for positively skewed distributions. Data were then ﬁtted
to a model containing the ﬁxed effects (i.e., Combination Type:
congruent, incongruent and Combination Order: congruent ﬁrst,
congruent second) and random effects (i.e., subjects and items)
using the restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML) pro-
cedure. Standardized predictors for the ﬁxed effects were used
to reduce collinearity between our ﬁxed-effects predictors. Fur-
ther, since preliminary analyses indicated that random slopes for
congruency were warranted for subjects, the following analyzes
include random slopes along with random intercepts. Because
MCMC sampling for models with random slopes has not yet
been implemented for lme4, predictor signiﬁcance is analyzed by
comparing nested models based on differences between likelihood
ratio chi-squares (χ2) using the maximum likelihood estimation
(ML). The results of chi-square analyses are provided for these
model comparisons.
Our second and more traditional analytical approach exam-
ined the effects of Combination Type (congruent, incongruent)
and Combination Order (congruent ﬁrst, congruent second) in
separate mixed ANOVAs by subjects and items.
In this experiment, outliers comprised 2.3% of all data, and
pre- and post-transformed Fisher’s skewness statistics were 1.14
and 0.54, respectively.
Implicit associations
A signiﬁcant effect of Combination Type (β= 0.042; SE= 0.005;
t = 7.81), revealed higher response latencies for incongruent
relative to congruent trials, conﬁrmed by model comparison
[χ2(1)= 38.37, p < 0.001]. Further, there was no effect of Combi-
nation Order (β= 0.002; SE= 0.010; t = 0.16), and no interaction
(β= 0.001; SE= 0.005; t = 0.19).
Similar results were found with the traditional ANOVAs, as
described in Table A1 in Appendix by subjects (F1), and items
(F2).
Overall, conceptually congruent pairings (powerful/mountainous,
average/level) were categorized signiﬁcantly faster than incongru-
ent pairings (average/mountainous, powerful/level), as depicted in
Figure 2. The overall D value for the effect was 0.69.
DISCUSSION
The ﬁrst experiment revealed faster categorization when power-
ful/mountains and average/level shared the same versus different
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FIGURE 2 | Mean and SE response latencies for each of the two
CombinationTypes (congruent, incongruent) and across all three
experiments.
response buttons, conﬁrming that there is an implicit association
between social status and vertical topographic space. Thus, power
is not merely associated with a vertically upward spatial position
on a computer monitor or upward gesturing, but also larger-scale
concepts of vertical space.
EXPERIMENT 2
Just how pervasive are the associations between social status
and vertical spatial representations? To test the possibility that
social status is implicitly associated with more abstract spa-
tial representations (i.e., cardinal directions), we modiﬁed the
IAT used in Experiment 1 by replacing the images of moun-
tainous/level terrain with images using stars overlaid on a map
to indicate north/south. If the association between power and
“up” extends to a more abstract spatial domain, then we should
see a response latency advantage when powerful/north and
average/south are categorized together, relative to the opposite
pairings.
METHOD
Participants and design
Forty undergraduates (age M = 20, SD= 1.47; 22 female) partici-
pated following the same design as Experiment 1.
Materials and procedure
Allmaterials andproceduresmatched those of Experiments 1,with
the exception of the attribute images (see examples in Figure 1).
The topographical attribute images of mountains and level terrain
were replaced with 12 map images (550× 413 pixels) that repre-
sented cardinal direction. Each image depicted an urban satellite
image background, gathered from unfamiliar locations (suburban
Canada: Winnipeg, MB, Calgary, AB, and Toronto, ON), using
the Google™Maps utility at a zoom level of 1′′ = 500 linear feet,
and contained a single yellow (75× 75 pixel) star occupying one
of six locations along the northern or southern border of the
image. Image luminance was equated using the same method as
in Experiment 1.
RESULTS
Scoring and analysis
As in Experiment 1, preliminary analyses indicated that random
slopes for congruency were warranted for subjects, so the mixed-
effects analyses include random slopes along with random inter-
cepts. As a result, predictor signiﬁcance is again analyzed through
model comparison.
In this experiment, outliers comprised 2.7% of all data, and
pre- and post-transformed Fisher’s skewness statistics were 1.09
and 0.54, respectively.
Implicit associations
A signiﬁcant effect of Combination Type (β= 0.025; SE= 0.005;
t = 4.77) indicated higher response latencies for incongruent
relative to congruent trials, conﬁrmed by model comparison
[χ2(1)= 18.85, p < 0.001]. Once again, there was no effect of
Combination Order (β=−0.002; SE= 0.009; t = 0.29), and no
interaction (β= 0.010; SE= 0.005; t = 1.82).
Similar results were found with the traditional ANOVAs, as
described in Table A1 in Appendix by subjects (F1), and items
(F2).
Overall, conceptually congruent pairings (powerful/north,
average/south) were categorized signiﬁcantly faster than incon-
gruent pairings (average/north, powerful/south), as depicted in
Figure 2. Overall D value for the effect was 0.35.
DISCUSSION
The goal of Experiment 2 was to examine the extent to which
social status is associated with various representations of space.
The results indicate that social status can be conceptually struc-
tured using more abstract representations of space, speciﬁcally
north and south cardinal directions. However, one limitation of
the present experiment is that rather than showing an implicit
association between social status and cardinal directions, we might
instead be showing an association between social status and ver-
tically directed visual attention. Our stimuli used the placement
of stars to represent “north” and “south,” which would direct
attention upward (north) or downward (south). While partic-
ipants were categorizing these images under the labels “north”
and “south,” there remains the possibility that vertically oriented
visual attention is driving our congruency effects, rather than an
unequivocal associationbetween cardinal directions and social sta-
tus. On the other hand, a recent study (Santana and deVega, 2011)
found that brieﬂy directed visual motion alone (i.e., separate from
hand motion) did not produce semantic-visual direction compat-
ibility effects on response times during a go/no-go task, suggesting
that visual motion is less important than motor motion for com-
prehending words semantically linked with vertical space. Thus,
wewould not expect the slight shifts in visual attention imposed by
the cardinal direction stimuli used in Experiment 2 to drive con-
gruent/incongruent categorization effects to the extent observed.
EXPERIMENT 3
The third experiment controls for shifts in upward/downward
visual attention that might be prompted by the star stimuli, and
thus assesses a relatively direct association between social status
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and cardinal direction. We replaced the cardinal direction indi-
cators used in Experiment 2 (i.e., maps with stars) with images
of compass roses to convey north/south. Thus, if the congruency
effects demonstrated in Experiment 2 are at least partially due
to an inherent association between cardinal directions and social
status, then we should replicate the same pattern of results. In
contrast, if social status is associated with upward and downward
shifts in visual attention, and not cardinal direction, then there
should be no speed advantage when categorizing powerful/north
and average/south.
METHOD
Participants and design
Forty undergraduates age M = 20, SD= 1.37; 18 female) partici-
pated following the same design as Experiments 1 and 2.
Materials and procedure
Allmaterials andproceduresmatched those of Experiments 2,with
the exception of the attribute images (see examples in Figure 1).
The cardinal direction attribute images of maps and stars were
replaced with 12 images (550× 413 pixels) that depicted a com-
pass rose with either an N or S in the center. These stimuli were
developed using six differently styled grayscale compass roses; half
of these 12 images depicted the letter N in the center (north), and
half the letter S in the center (south). The letters N and S were
always depicted in red 60-point Times New Roman font. Image
luminance was equated using the same method as in Experiments
1 and 2.
RESULTS
Scoring and analysis
As in Experiments 1 and 2, preliminary analyses indicated that
random slopes for congruency were warranted for subjects, so
the following analyzes include random slopes along with random
intercepts, and predictor signiﬁcance is analyzed through model
comparison.
In this experiment, outliers comprised 3.0% of all data, and
pre- and post-transformed Fisher’s skewness statistics were 1.25
and 0.68, respectively.
Implicit associations
A signiﬁcant effect of Combination Type (β= 0.012; SE= 0.006;
t = 2.19) demonstrated higher response latencies for incongru-
ent relative to congruent trials, and again conﬁrmed by model
comparison [χ2(1)= 4.71, p = 0.03]. Further, there was no effect
of Combination Order (β= 0.010; SE= 0.009; t = 1.13), and no
interaction (β= 0.007; SE= 0.006; t = 1.31).
Similar results were found with the traditional ANOVAs, as
described in Table A1 in Appendix by subjects (F1), and items
(F2).
Once again, conceptually congruent pairings (powerful/north,
average/south) were categorized signiﬁcantly faster than incon-
gruent pairings (average/north, powerful/south), as depicted in
Figure 2. Overall D value for the effect was 0.35.
DISCUSSION
Results of Experiment 3 suggest that social status is associated
with vertically conceptualized cardinal directions evenwhen visual
attention is consistently directed to the center of the screen. By
depicting canonical terms using compass roses with either an N
or S in the center, we replicated the implicit association between
social status and north/south observed in Experiment 2, conﬁrm-
ing that social status is associated with cardinal direction in the
absence of explicit upward and downward shifts in visual atten-
tion. In addition, while Experiments 2 and 3 produced equivalent
overall effects, the main effect of Combination Type was of slightly
less magnitude in Experiment 3. Thus, there is some suggestion
that the relatively robust effect of Combination Type in Experi-
ment 2 might be at least partially due to stimulus-driven subtle
shifts in visual attention along the vertical axis. In any event, it
is compelling that the effect of Combination Type persisted with
stimuli that would be expected to promote a relatively constrained
central visual focus.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In March 2011, the cover of Harvard Business Review displayed
a compass pointing north, and the title, “How to Make It to the
Top.” The article outlines important leadership skills for “mov-
ing up” in the business world. We provide novel evidence that
such marketing-based illustrations aimed at enticing a readership
may accurately demonstrate how people perceive and think about
social status and real-world spatial concepts. In Experiment 1,
we demonstrated that social status is associated with topography,
in that participants categorized powerful and average individuals
faster when they were paired with mountainous and level terrain,
respectively. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed an association between
social status and north/south cardinal direction. Together, our
results suggest that people not only automatically stratify levels of
social power on a vertical axis, but also that mental representations
of social status are linked with larger-scale and abstract spatial
concepts also conceptualized in vertical space. Thus,abovedemon-
strating a metaphorical mapping between abstract and concrete
concepts, we have found evidence for second-order metaphor-
ical mapping between abstract concepts, facilitated by shared
associations with vertical space.
There is no evident reason why people would associate pow-
erful individuals with mountains rather than plains or with the
north rather than south. We do not often see or talk about CEOs
standing on mountain peaks or occupying ofﬁces primarily on
the north side of town. Yet, by merely thinking about social sta-
tus as a hierarchy occupying the vertical spatial dimension, the
present experiments suggest that we automatically extend social
ideas not just to simple vertical spatial positions, but also to unre-
lated real-world spatial concepts that are likewise conceptualized
in vertical space. From the perspective of Barsalou (1999) per-
ceptual symbol systems theory, when we conceptualize north,
mountains, or powerful people we might simulate similar modal
representations of “up”: perhaps looking upward at a parent, tow-
ering mountain peaks, or north on a map. Accordingly, if our
modal representations of power and mountains/north both cor-
respond with “up,” then our conceptualizations of power and
mountains/north would be more similar than those of power and
level/south. Thus, concepts that share similar spatial associations
(through either modality-speciﬁc or amodal representations of
space) may transitively become associated.
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Note that our results do not provide explicit evidence in favor
of embodiment over metaphor theories (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson,
1980), and the observed associations between social status and
topography/cardinal directions could be generated via an amodal
second-order metaphorical mapping from target to attribute (e.g.,
powerful = up, north = up, thus powerful = north), driven by lin-
guistic terms or other amodal representations, and removed from
bodily experiences. It remains open whether action simulation
and/or bodily experience are necessary to understand even inher-
ently spatial concepts like up/down, forward/backward, left/right,
irrespective of the abstract concepts themselves. Further, even if
social status is understood through embodied representations,
other abstract concepts (e.g., democracy) are likely not associ-
ated with speciﬁc perceptuo-motor experiences, and thus might
be understood in other ways (Machery, 2007; Dove, 2009). For
instance, some abstract concepts (e.g., trust ) might be tied to
interoceptive, affective experiences rather than an action, per se.
Likewise, perhaps only abstract concepts tied to probabilistically
consistent locations in space (e.g., power = up) remain directly
associated with that location and corresponding action simula-
tions, whereas concepts that are not bound to a particular location
or salient experience (e.g., implication) might not depend upon a
speciﬁc simulated perceptuo-motoric representation.
Moreover, Mahon and Caramazza’s (2008) grounding by inter-
action framework suggests that the vertical sensory–motor action
simulated when understanding social status may serve to enrich
amodal information, “providing it with a relational context” (p.
10). Thus, while social status itself may be comprehended to some
degree in amodal terms without activating a motoric simulation, a
simulation grounded in perceptuo-motor experience may be nec-
essary to bridge the connection between power, “up,” and other
experientially unrelated spatial concepts, like topography or car-
dinal directions. Similarly, the language and situated simulation
(LASS) theory assumes that concepts are represented through
the interaction of both linguistic and sensory–motor simulations,
and deeper conceptual processing depends upon activation of the
simulation system (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2008). The Symbol Inter-
dependency Theory proposed by Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2008,
2010) also maintains that conceptual processing is both linguistic
and embodied, depending on both the task and the stimuli (e.g.,
pictures, words). According to this theory, shallow, rapid mental
representations often draw on linguistic factors, whereas deeper,
slower representations are commonly tied to embodiment (Louw-
erse and Connell, 2011). Notably, language can reﬂect perceptual
relations through linguistic structure, and thus these amodal lin-
guistic factorsmay contribute to someputatively embodied effects.
For instance, word pairs like “monitor – keyboard” and “pan –
stove” appear more frequently in an order which preserves the
physical relation of the objects, i.e., “up – down.” With regard to
the present experiments it is possible that the concepts “powerful –
average,” “mountainous terrain – level terrain” and “north – south”
occur more frequently in language in the given order, and as a
result the current ﬁndings may be mediated by linguistic struc-
ture. So while the words “powerful” and “mountain” may not
often co-occur in language, their relative relationship within a
common word binomial may contribute to associations between
concepts.
Yet it is unclear if shallow linguistic processing alone is suf-
ﬁcient to enable such associations between otherwise unrelated
concepts, and further, to what extent these basic linguistic struc-
tures are dependant upon perceptual relations. There remains the
possibility that linguistic structure mediates associations between
words within a binomial, but deeper, embodied processing may
be necessary to draw associations between binomials. Further,
because we used photographs as stimuli, it is likely that deeper
processing via embodied factors contributed to conceptualization
of the basic terms (e.g., power), and thus mediated the connection
between the broader concepts (e.g. power >mountain). Exper-
iments examining the representational nature of second-order
associations between concrete and abstract concepts, represented
with both pictures and words, may help inform the embodiment
debate, and thus prove valuable for future research. In any case,
the present experiments provide compelling evidence that social
status is linked to abstracted spatial concepts like topography and
cardinal direction via shared spatial associations in the vertical
dimension. Whether similar linguistic structures reﬂecting these
spatial relations are sufﬁcient for bridging associations between
seemingly unrelated word pairings remains open.
As with all cognitive tasks, the IAT carries a set of limitations.
First, some suggest that the order of congruent/incongruent blocks
might generate response slowing when participants switch cat-
egorization rules simply due to a task set switch cost (Messner
and Vosgerau, 2010). In the present experiments, we accounted
for block order effects by counterbalancing the order of congru-
ent and incongruent blocks across participants. Thus, while the
categorization response times for a single participant may not reli-
ably indicate their personal associations between social status and
topography/cardinal direction, the group level results are indica-
tive of general associations. Second, others suggest that stimulus
unfamiliarity might lead participants to more easily classify unfa-
miliar stimuli as unpleasant (e.g., low familiarity with African–
American names can result in misleading associations between
“black” and “unpleasant”; Ottaway et al., 2001; see also Bren-
del et al., 2001). However, because our attribute categories were
not deﬁned by valenced attitudinal beliefs (e.g., pleasant versus
unpleasant), it seems unlikely that familiarity with target category
stimuli would alter speeded categorizations. Third, IAT resultsmay
also be partially driven by asymmetric category salience, which
may facilitate speeded classiﬁcations between target and attribute
categories with shared salience (Rothermund andWentura, 2004).
Thus, if powerful individuals and mountainous terrain are per-
ceived as more salient than average individuals and level terrain,
participants might associate powerful/mountains because both
categories are relatively salient when compared to average/level,
and as a result, Experiment 1 effects might be partially attributable
to salience asymmetry. It is unlikely, however, that this potential
limitation inﬂuences Experiment 2 and 3 results, given no a pri-
ori justiﬁcation for differential salience between north and south
concepts. Finally, we also note that the IAT does not allow us to
precisely identify the source or directionality of observed associ-
ations between social status and topography/cardinal direction.
Indeed difﬁculty associating one of the pairings (e.g., power-
ful/level) could drive slower categorization response times for
all incompatible trials, and consequently we cannot identify if
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our effects are driven solely by associations between powerful
and mountains/north, average and level/south, or both. Simi-
larly, the IAT cannot provide insights into the directionality of
associations between target and attribute categories; thus, partic-
ipants may have stronger associations between powerful people
and mountains/north, than mountains/north and powerful peo-
ple, or vice-versa. In any case, the extant literature provides strong
justiﬁcation for the associative link between social status and the
vertical dimension. It is thus likely that participants are mapping
social status, topography, and cardinal directions to the vertical
dimension relative to the other categories, associating powerful
people/mountains/north as relatively more “upward” in compar-
ison to average people/level/south. Future research may better
disentangle the precise relationships between these factors.
Anthropological and psychological theories posit that associ-
ations between abstract concepts and physical percepts develop
in response to everyday experiences (e.g., Hebb, 1949; Bourdieu,
1977; Barsalou, 1999). Since abstract concepts like social status are
perceived in a spatial world (e.g., a small child perceives a taller par-
ent as the leader), our mental representations of abstract concepts
integrate spatial knowledge, most likely related on some level to
perceptuo-motor experiences. In fact,preverbal infants as young as
10months old automatically combine spatial and social concepts,
using relative size as an indicator of social dominance (Thomsen
et al., 2011), likely relying on accumulated experiences with their
environment. Further, when we think about abstract concepts,
drawing on these perceptuo-motoric experiences via simulation
may serve to enrich our abstract representations, and enable us
to draw connections between experientially unrelated concepts.
Perhaps inﬂuenced by social–spatial experiences and their cor-
responding associations, our built environment also both reﬂects
and conveys social concepts (e.g., kings on elevated thrones; sports
victors on platforms; CEOs in top-ﬂoor ofﬁces), which then serves
as yet another source of perceptual social–spatial associations.
Cultures around the world have combined social concepts and
vertical space for centuries. The ancient Maya constructed their
cities with the elite in the north and atop hills (Robin, 2001). In
Pohnpei, Micronesia, the most powerful chiefs sit in the highest
places, and members of the highest chief ’s clan are called sohpeidi,
literally meaning “facing downward” (Keating, 1995). The United
States Capitol building was intentionally placed atop Jenkin’s
Hill, described by the original architect Pierre Charles L’Enfant
as a “pedestal waiting for a monument. . .[whose]. . .height every
grand building would rear with a majestied aspect over the Coun-
try all around” (L’Enfant, 1899, p. 35/29). The Capitol sits 80
feet above the Potomac, with commanding views up and down
the river – a non-linguistic “symbol of federal power surveying
the land over which the Legislature and Executive govern” (Wor-
thington, 2005, p. 9). Likewise, underlying associations between
power and “up” permeate our world today, impacting how we
construct, arrange, talk about, and perceive the surrounding
environment.
The implicit associations between social status and spatial con-
cepts can impact both social and spatial perceptions, and thereby
inﬂuence decision making across both domains. For instance, the
association between cardinal direction and social statusmight lead
us to pay more for a home on the north side of town. Similarly, we
might head uphill (or up an elevator) to ﬁnd leaders, or offer job
opportunities or promotions to taller employees. Overall, these
simple underlying associations wield a powerful, pervasive inﬂu-
ence over how we understand the world, and may prove inﬂuential
in guiding our daily judgments and actions.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | ANOVA by subjects and by items results for each of the three experiments.
Experiment and effect Subjects analysis result Items analysis result
EXPERIMENT 1
Combination type F 1(1,38)=67.14, p <0.01, η2 =0.64 F 2(1,15)=98.34, p <0.01, η2 =0.64
Combination order F 1(1,38)=0.12, p =0.75, η2 <0.01 F 2(1,15)=0.61, p =0.45, η2 <0.01
Combination type× combination order F 1(1,38)=0.06, p =0.80, η2 <0.01 F 2(1,15)=0.44, p =0.52, η2 <0.01
EXPERIMENT 2
Combination type F 1(1,38)=37.82, p <0.01, η2 =0.48 F 2(1,15)=42.85, p <0.01, η2 =0.41
Combination order F 1(1,38)=0.01, p =0.94, η2 <0.01 F 2(1,15)<0.01, p =0.95, η2 <0.01
Combination type× combination order F 1(1,38)=2.43, p =0.13, η2 =0.03 F 2(1,15)=9.21, p <0.05, η2 =0.07
EXPERIMENT 3
Combination type F 1(1,38)=10.42, p <0.01, η2 =0.21 F 2(1,15)=10.72, p <0.01, η2 =0.16
Combination order F 1(1,38)=0.58, p =0.45, η2 =0.02 F 2(1,15)=5.12, p <0.05, η2 =0.06
Combination type× combination order F 1(1,38)=0.55, p =0.46, η2 =0.01 F 2(1,15)=0.43, p =0.52, η2 =0.01
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